Kremlin-Backed Депеша on Georgian Telegram
Georgian-language Telegram channels have increasingly amplified Kremlin-backed disinformation ahead of the 2024 elections, reinforcing pro-Russian narratives among their target audience – an IWPR OSINT investigation reveals.
- In this article, you’ll discover:
· That Despite Telegram’s relatively limited use in Georgia, 17 identified pro-Kremlin channels have managed to reach over 62,000 Georgian subscribers. The growing number of followers is particularly notable given the unique behavior of Telegram’s audience in the country.
· That the Information operations on Telegram are strategically linking disinformation to sensitive societal topics such as demographics, family values, and education to deepen societal division.
· That These disinformation narratives are often echoed or even repeated by leaders of the ruling Georgian Dream party. This tactic amplifies their reach, exploiting existing social divisions to polarize Georgian society further.
· That In the absence of strong engagement from local media and civil society on the platform, Kremlin-backed actors effectively use Georgian Telegram to sow discord. For instance, disinformation campaigns based on gender and identity issues have been used to foster social tensions and manipulate public sentiments.
Why Telegram?
Social media is the second most important source of information in Georgia, with 56.3% of the population relying on it. According to the most recent Survey of Public Opinion in Georgia (ISSA), conducted in early 2025, television remains the primary source of information.
While specific data on Telegram’s share among social media platforms is unavailable, our investigation confirms that the number of subscribers to pro-Kremlin Georgian-language channels on Telegram is steadily increasing.
Researchers studying Russian government influence have closely monitored Telegram’s predominantly Russian-language content since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As users increasingly turned to Telegram channels for information amid the war-induced crisis, a DFRLab study later noted that no other social media platform has expanded its role in conveying the Russian perspective on the war to the outside world as much as Telegram, launched by Russian entrepreneur Pavel Durov in 2013.
However, pro-Kremlin actors in Georgia began exploiting Telegram even before the events of February 2022 and primarily in Georgian, not Russian. This shift was largely driven by Facebook’s policy changes, which increasingly restricted propaganda and disinformation channels on the platform, which remains the most popular social network in Georgia.
One of the earliest groups to adopt Telegram was the pro-Russian conservative movement Alt-Info and its affiliates. Their channels were also included in the IWPR monitoring presented in this article.
Russian propaganda researcher Sopho Gelava confirms our findings that the migration of pro-Russian actors to Telegram in Georgia was driven by two main factors: the platform’s minimal content moderation and the increasing restrictions imposed by Meta on disinformation and propaganda.
For example, Sopho recalls that Telegram, among other platforms, was used by far-right groups to organize a media raid on July 5, 2021, during which more than 50 journalists and cameramen were injured. Tragically, one cameraman who was injured in the attack died a few days later.
We had to record our interview with Sopho Gelava outside of Georgia, as the disinformation researcher hastily left the country. This followed the unexpected police raid of her home and another DFRLab researcher, Eto Buziashvili, just two days before the 2024 parliamentary elections, under suspicious allegations of financial crimes.
Which Channels Did the Investigation Uncover?
An IWPR OSINT investigation into Georgian-language content on Telegram revealed a strategic shift in Russian influence operations, positioning the platform as a new hub for disinformation in Georgia.
In addition to the previously mentioned Alt-Info, the study uncovered a network of at least 17 channels with a combined subscriber base exceeding 62,000 in the lead-up to the election—a significant figure considering Telegram’s user behavior patterns in Georgia.
The identified channels include:
- Alt-Info – 11,205 subscribers
- Zurab Makharadze – 4,563 subscribers
- Beka Vardosanidze – 4,415 subscribers
- World Politics – 13,040 subscribers
- Konstantine Morgoshia – 1,704 subscribers
- Guram Falavandishvili – 1,657 subscribers
- Giorgi Kardava – 2,163 subscribers
- Irakli Martynenko – 1,569 subscribers
- Anti-Liberals – 714 subscribers
- Alt-Info News – 10,857 subscribers
- Shota Martynenko – 2,088 subscribers
- Who Rules the World – 1,563 subscribers
- Nikoloz Mzhavanadze – 2,703 subscribers
- China News – 1,443 subscribers
- Solar Energy – 1,124 subscribers
- New World Order – Resistance – 868 subscribers
- Red Pill – 567 subscribers
The audience for these channels has continued to grow since the study concluded.
What Issues Are Fueling the Propaganda?
The content shared on these channels largely mirrors the disinformation narratives propagated by pro-Kremlin actors across other media platforms, including social media. This strategy reinforces existing disinformation, amplifying its influence on the target audience.
IWPR’s monitoring highlights a strong focus on disinformation related to gender identity, which is consistently spread across the identified channels.
A significant portion of the analyzed posts claims that feminism and LGBTQ+ advocacy are Western imports that negatively affect Georgian society. This narrative aims to exploit cultural sensitivities and deepen social division within the country.
The content circulated through these channels seeks to convince audiences of various misleading and exaggerated claims. For example, it falsely asserts that Yale’s Gender Pediatric Clinic accepts patients as young as three years old, that a so-called “transgender organization” has lowered the age for gender reassignment surgery and hormone therapy, and that the number of sex reassignment surgeries has dramatically increased in recent years. Additionally, it claims that studies show transgender individuals frequently suffer from depression, which allegedly leads to suicidal thoughts and self-harm.
These channels also amplify anecdotal and unverified stories, such as a case in Ontario where parents allegedly protested the appearance of a transgender teacher in the classroom. According to these narratives, the school board reviewed the case but ultimately rejected the parents’ request, allowing the teacher to continue working. An unverified quote attributed to the school principal circulates alongside the story, claiming he “emphasized” that “it is important for our staff to express their gender identity.”
There are unfounded claims circulating that Germany will open its first kindergarten specifically for gay and lesbian children next spring.
In addition to spreading disinformation about the negative impact of feminism, LGBTQ+ individuals, and liberalism, these channels employ well-established propaganda tactics. An analysis of hundreds of posts reveals a deliberate focus on the most sensitive issues within Georgian society, linking these topics to gender and identity-based disinformation. The propaganda narratives are carefully tailored to exploit concerns around demography, family values, divorce rates, and the education system.
These disinformation messages often mirror the rhetoric used by representatives of the ruling Georgian Dream party. IWPR researchers frequently encountered posts on these channels quoting leaders of the Georgian Dream, further amplifying the narratives and reinforcing their influence on the local audience.
The theme of an “attack on the family” is a pervasive element of the propaganda spread by the investigated channels. The main message disseminated is that the institution of the family in Georgia is under threat. According to these propagandists, this threat comes from multiple directions—ranging from so-called “gender policies” to “scenes staged at the opening of the 2024 Olympics.”
The scenography of the Olympics’ opening ceremony has become a recurring campaign theme on Georgian-language Telegram channels. It is used as supposed evidence that family values—across all ages and religions—are being equally undermined through the staging of such scenes.
The demographic situation is also a key topic for spreading propaganda narratives on Georgian-language Telegram channels. According to official statistics, Georgia’s birth rate has been steadily declining each year, while the number of deaths continues to surpass births. In 2023, this trend was observed across all regions of Georgia, with the only exceptions being Tbilisi, Adjara, and the Kvemo Kartli region.
One of the primary factors contributing to the population decline is emigration. In 2022 alone, more than 100,000 people aged 15 to 64 left Georgia,.
However, the propaganda channels under investigation attribute the country’s demographic challenges not to emigration but to an alleged “attack on family values” and gender politics.
In this context, propagandists frequently share statements from international figures to support their narratives. For example, they cite Giorgia Meloni, the leader of Italy’s centrist coalition, who said: “Why is the family the enemy? Why are they so afraid of the family? There is only one answer to these questions. Because it defines us. It is our identity. Because everything that defines us is now the enemy of those who want us to have no identity and to be simply slaves…”
Similarly, they reference examples of so-called “international practices,” such as large-scale demonstrations in Belgrade supporting traditional family values. They also spread speeches from figures like Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of Poland’s Conservative Party, who stated: “Poland must stand up to the cultural revolution taking place in the world and defend the traditional family model, consisting of a man, a woman, and children.” These examples are used to reinforce their message and legitimize the promotion of traditionalist narratives.
Divorce statistics also fuel propaganda narratives. In 2023, 13,664 out of 22,275 marriages ended in divorce, which propagandists attribute to the “liberal economic, political, and ideological structure.” They claim that the implementation of “gender-liberal policies” has led to an alarming rise in Georgia’s divorce rate.
To reinforce this message, propagandists often draw comparisons with the Soviet era, stating that “during the time of Mzhavanadze”—referring to Vasil Mzhavanadze, the Georgian Soviet politician who served as the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Georgian SSR from 1953 to 1972—“the divorce rate was only 2%, whereas today it stands at 70%.”
The education system is a frequent target of criticism from propaganda outlets, which claim that “liberals” are brainwashing children. A recurring concern raised by these narratives is the supposed negative impact of introducing “sex education” in schools. There is also a persistent demand to reinstate icons and crosses in classrooms, despite the fact that, in most schools, such religious symbols were never removed.
Phrases and messages identified in IWPR’s investigation of the Georgian-language propaganda network were echoed in the pre-election speeches of Georgian Dream leaders, including Irakli Gharibashvili, Shalva Papuashvili, Irakli Kobakhidze, and others.
How Effective Is It?
A recent 2024 study published by Cornell University, titled “Characterizing and Detecting Propaganda Accounts on Telegram,” analyzed a vast database of over 7 million Telegram comments and messages. The study found that, due to the platform’s unique characteristics, disinformation can be significantly more effective on Telegram than on other social media platforms.
The research revealed that “Effectiveness of propaganda messages is comparable to the effectiveness of messages by actual users. The distributions are similar, indicating that users are unlikely to distinguish propaganda accounts from other users”.
See the corresponding diagram below:
,,How disinformation thrives on Telegram? ‘ – Researcher Anastasia Tetarenko explored this question in an analysis for the influential Baltic media outlet Re:baltica in the article “Kremlin’s propaganda in our pockets.” Tetarenko concludes that in the Baltics, the most popular Telegram channels targeting local Russian-speaking citizens often don’t have large numbers of followers. However, this isn’t their primary function—their main role is to amplify each other’s content and create the illusion of widespread consensus. A similar pattern can be observed in the Georgian-speaking space, as confirmed by the author of one of the Telegram channels interviewed for this investigation.
Other parallels have also emerged between the Baltic states and Georgia. In both cases, Telegram usage surged after restrictions were placed on other news platforms. In Georgia, limitations on content imposed by Meta pushed pro-Kremlin actors toward Telegram, while in the Baltics, the ban on Kremlin-backed television and online media served as a trigger for increased Telegram activity.
Telegram is a cloud-based instant messaging platform known for its speed, security, and strong focus on user privacy. It allows users to send text messages, voice messages, multimedia files, and make voice and video calls. One of Telegram’s standout features is its ability to host large group chats and broadcast channels, which are curated by users based on their specific interests.
Unlike standard social media platforms, where content appears on a user’s timeline through algorithms based on preferences and remains accessible to random users, Telegram operates differently. Access to the target audience and subscriber behavior is more direct and intentional. This unique structure influences how information is received and disseminated, as subscribers typically join groups or channels voluntarily, creating a more focused and engaged audience.
Various studies, along with in-depth interviews with our sources, indicate distinct behavior patterns among Telegram users. This audience is largely characterized by a high rate of information replication—both within Telegram and across other social networks and public spaces.
We discussed the effectiveness of propaganda on Telegram with República researcher Anastasia Tetarenko.
Who is Behind These Channels?
The individuals linked to the studied channels are notable for their pro-Russian statements, frequent criticism of Western and Ukrainian authorities, and calls for Georgia to abandon its pro-Western course. Instead of pursuing transatlantic integration, they advocate for initiating negotiations with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Experts believe that the spread of Kremlin propaganda does not necessarily require direct instructions from the Kremlin itself. Baltic disinformation researcher Martins Hirs highlights that pro-Kremlin messages are often shared by ordinary individuals who either believe in the Kremlin’s narratives or gain some personal benefit from promoting them. “Yes, the Kremlin – Putin, Lavrov, and others – sets the tone or the main messages that are repeated in Russia and resonate emotionally with the audiences through Kremlin-controlled media. At the same time, the Kremlin directly controls many influencers and trolls who repeat the necessary messages on social networks.” – Hirs explains.
The creators of the network accounts identified in this investigation have been directly and repeatedly accused of having ties to the Kremlin. These individuals are also known to maintain profitable relationships with the Georgian Dream government.
Among the 17 channels analyzed, those with the largest followings are linked to the pro-Russian political party, the Conservative Movement, and AltInfo—a far-right, pro-Russian media organization notorious for promoting hate speech and inciting violent demonstrations.
In December 2024, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed financial sanctions on two of AltInfo’s founders, Zurab Makharadze and Konstantin Morgoshia. Both were added to the global Magnitsky list, which initially targeted members of Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, judiciary, and the FSB for human rights violations and corruption.
Alt-Info participated in the 2024 parliamentary elections as part of the electoral list of the “Alliance of Patriots.” Several years ago, the investigative journalism platform Dossier, founded by former political prisoner Mikhail Khodorkovsky, revealed documents indicating that the Alliance of Patriots had been advised by individuals with connections to the Russian government prior to the elections. These figures allegedly submitted reports on their activities to Russian state structures.
According to the Dossier report, the Alliance of Patriots paid $700,000 to Politsecrets, a consulting firm run by a political technologist under the supervision of Russian security agencies, for services related to the 2020 parliamentary elections. This sum was part of a total budget of $8.5 million allocated for the four-month pre-election campaign.
Although the Alliance of Patriots denies receiving $8 million in funding from Russia, it does acknowledge cooperation with a Russian consulting firm.
The Alliance of Patriots failed to pass the 5% threshold in the 2024 elections, and the founders of AltInfo now believe their voters were influenced by the Georgian Dream, particularly after it began aligning itself with far-right group narratives.
In 2022, Konstantine Morgoshia, one of the founders of the pro-Russian Conservative Movement and AltInfo, announced that he was relocating his business to Russia. Morgoshia explained that his decision was driven by “much greater business opportunities” in Russia. He told a TV Pirveli journalist, “In fact, I have already completed negotiations and am moving to the Russian Federation for business activities… because there are much greater opportunities for my business [in Russia].”
Morgoshia also shared photos of himself posing in front of the Kremlin in Moscow.
We investigated the financing of the media group associated with this far-right pro-Kremlin party at the Georgian National Communications Commission. Our findings revealed that Alt-Info has a single primary financier: Konstantine Morgoshia’s aunt, Tsiala Morgoshia. She has been providing TV Alt-Info with an average of 140,000 GEL (approximately 50,000 USD) per quarter.
We sought answers to questions regarding where Tsiala Morgoshia obtained such substantial funds. However, despite our efforts to reach out to Alt-Info representatives for an interview, they did not respond to our requests.
Earlier, an investigation by an OCCRP partner revealed that companies owned by Konstantine Morgoshia and his family signed multiple state procurement contracts with the Georgian Dream government and acquired significant real estate near Tbilisi at minimal prices.
Several investigations have pointed to Morgoshia making millions in profits through Tbilisi City Hall contracts.
Morgoshia was also featured in an investigation by OCCRP’s Georgia-based partner, iFact, which uncovered how companies owned by Morgoshia and his family won numerous state procurement contracts. As a result, they were able to acquire large amounts of real estate on the outskirts of Tbilisi from the state at nominal prices.
Other investigative documents revealed that the Tbilisi City Hall’s architectural department was exclusively issuing questionable building permits to Konstantine Morgoshia, the newly sanctioned founder of Alt-Info, while similar proposals from others were repeatedly rejected. As a result, Morgoshia, one of the first organizers of pro-Russian and extremist groups, acquired real estate valued at up to 5 million GEL.
How about Telegram?
While Telegram has been a tool for spreading propaganda, it has also played a positive role in several global protests and conflicts between 2019 and 2022:
For instance, during the Hong Kong protests (2019–2020), protesters used Telegram to organize demonstrations.
In Belarus (2020), during the post-election unrest, Telegram channels like NEXTA became a major source of independent news.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Telegram has become a major information battlefield. In Stasia, we discussed how Russian propaganda channels spreading disinformation and pro-Kremlin narratives flourished on the platform. However, Telegram is also effectively used by pro-Ukrainian channels, including Ukrainian officials themselves.
It was after the start of the Russia-Ukraine war that journalist Teona Tskhomelidze decided to create her own Telegram channel. As this article is one of the rare examples of research on Georgian-language Telegram, we spoke with Teona to understand how the Georgian-language audience behaves on the platform. The interview revealed the distinct patterns of user behavior on Telegram.
Teona Tskhomelidze spoke to us about how propaganda channels are effectively engaging Georgian audiences, while local media and pro-democracy actors are neglecting the platform. A recent Cornell University study on Telegram also suggests that mitigating information-based attacks on instant messaging-based social networks is possible.
,, We hope that our results inspire the security community to broaden its attention beyond Western-centered social networks and build more tools to reduce information-based attacks worldwide.”
Authors:
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